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THE SEPARATION OF POWERS AS A SAFEGUARD
OF NATIONALISM
Carlos Manuel Vázquez*
INTRODUCTION
In his important article Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism,1 Bradford Clark argues that the procedures set forth in the Constitution for creating supreme federal law were designed to, and do,
protect the interests of the states. I argue here that Clark tells only
half the story. The procedures set forth in the Constitution also operate, and were designed to operate, to safeguard nationalism. This fact
does not require a rejection of Clark’s claim that the Constitution’s
enumeration of specified procedures for federal lawmaking rules out
procedures less protective of state interests.2 Thus, it turns out that
Clark’s principal doctrinal claim is quite independent of his claim
about federalism. But Clark’s doctrinal story is also incomplete. It is
equally true that the Constitution rules out the judiciary’s imposition
of additional obstacles to federal lawmaking. Moreover, recognition
that the Founders’ specification of procedures for federal lawmaking
reflects a careful balance between federalism and nationalism calls
into question a number of Clark’s subsidiary doctrinal claims.
Clark argues that the Constitution’s specification of three particular mechanisms for the creation of supreme federal law—enactment
of statutes through the procedures of bicameralism and presentment,
conclusion of treaties by the President with the consent of two-thirds
 2008 Carlos Manuel Vázquez. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may
reproduce and distribute copies of this Article in any format, at or below cost, for
educational purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to
the Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this provision and copyright notice.
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I am grateful to Curtis
Bradley, Bradford Clark, Duncan Hollis, Jonathan Molot, and Michael Seidman for
helpful comments, and to Rupal Doshi and Mark Herman for excellent research
assistance.
1 Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L.
REV. 1321 (2001).
2 See id. at 1328–31.
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of the Senate (and another country), and amendment of the Constitution through specified procedures—operates to protect the states
from having their laws displaced by federal law.3 He argues that the
Founders had the interests of the states in mind when they adopted
these mechanisms.4 He notes, in particular, that each mechanism
gives a prominent role to the Senate, which was regarded by the Founders as the chamber of the legislature that would be most solicitous of
state interests.5 Because the Supremacy Clause lists these and only
these mechanisms for enacting preemptive federal law, and because
permitting other methods of displacing state law would circumvent
the process the Founders carefully designed to protect the states, he
concludes that the three procedures specified in the Constitution for
creating supreme federal law are exclusive.6
Clark’s argument rests on the idea that the procedures established by the Constitution for creating federal law are onerous.
Rather than just requiring approval by the majority of a single representative body, the Constitution requires, for statutes, majorities in
two differently constituted chambers, plus the approval of yet another
differently constituted entity (the President), or a two-thirds majority
in the two chambers without the third entity.7 Treaties require the
approval of the President plus two-thirds of one of the chambers of
the legislature.8 By making the running of this gauntlet9 a require3 See id. at 1331–46.
4 See id. at 1328–29 (“The Founders designed ‘the interior structure of the government’ not only to empower the political branches to check each other, but also to
ensure that they would consider state prerogatives in performing their functions.”).
5 See id. at 1342–43 (“Federal lawmaking procedures . . . maximized state influence by singling out the Senate—the federal institution in which the states had the
greatest influence—to participate in all forms of federal lawmaking.”).
6 See id. at 1338–39. Clark does not agree with Professors Wechsler and Choper
that the Constitution entirely relegates state interests to the political safeguards of
federalism. See JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 175–76 (1980); Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of
the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV.
543, 558 (1954). Clark clearly does not maintain that the courts should decline to
exercise judicial review of federal legislation to enforce the limits of congressional
power. See Clark, supra note 1, at 1368; cf. CHOPER, supra, at 175–76 (noting that “the
constitutional issue of whether federal action is beyond the authority of the central
government and thus violates ‘states’ rights’ should be treated as nonjusticiable”).
But he does maintain that the procedural requirements for enacting supreme federal
law were among the Constitution’s mechanisms for protecting state interests. See
Clark, supra note 1, at 1375.
7 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
8 See id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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ment of creating supreme federal law, the Constitution protects the
states, whose laws would otherwise govern by default.10
Clark may be right that the procedures established by the Constitution for enacting supreme federal law were designed by the Founders to privilege states. It is also undoubtedly true that, in the
beginning, the consequence of a failure to run this gauntlet successfully was that state law would continue to govern. (I put to one side
for the moment the possibility that the Founders viewed the powers
enumerated in the Constitution as belonging exclusively to the federal government so that state law would be preempted even without
conflicting federal law.) Nevertheless, Clark’s claim seems mistaken
in at least two respects. First, the gauntlet he describes does not invariably operate to protect states from having their laws displaced.
Instead it sometimes hinders the devolution of legislative power to the
states. Rather than protect state interests, it privileges the legal status
quo—whether that status quo be state law or federal. Presumably,
Clark’s argument regarding the exclusivity of the procedures specified
in the Constitution for creating supreme federal law would not vary
depending on whether the gauntlet operated to protect state law from
displacement or hinder the devolution of power to the states. It follows that Clark’s argument does not really rest on the point that he
makes in the title of his article. The specified procedures for creating
federal law are exclusive whether or not they operate as a safeguard of
federalism.
Second, the gauntlet operates to privilege the status quo only
insofar as it is indeed onerous. Yet, in an important respect, the salient point about the procedures established by the Constitution for
creating supreme federal law is not that they are hard, but that they
are easy. Of course, whether the procedures are easy or hard depends
on the procedures one is comparing them to. While one might imagine alternative procedures that would have made creation of supreme
federal law easier, a more pertinent point of comparison would be the
system the Constitution replaced. Under the Articles of Confederation, it was quite difficult to displace state law.11 That was indeed one
of the key problems with those Articles. The procedures set up by the
Constitution for creating supreme federal law were adopted to make it
easier to displace state law.
9 I borrow that gauntlet metaphor from Ernest A. Young, State Sovereign Immunity
and the Future of Federalism, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 25.
10 See Clark, supra note 1, at 1339.
11 See infra notes 24–34 and accompanying text.
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Of course, the Founders set up a system for creating supreme
federal law that they regarded as neither too easy nor too hard. They
struck a balance between federalism and nationalism. Thus, while
one might agree with Clark that the enumeration of a particular set of
procedures for creating supreme federal law makes it illegitimate to
permit the creation of supreme federal law through less onerous procedures, it is equally true that the enumeration of certain procedures
makes it illegitimate to engraft additional requirements for the creation of such law or to subtract from the preemptive force of federal
law once made. Accepting easier procedures circumvents requirements imposed to protect the status quo; engrafting additional
requirements defeats the intent not to make the enactment of
supreme federal law too difficult. Though the proposition seems
unexceptional, the Supreme Court appears to have overlooked it in its
recent decision in Medellı́n v. Texas.12
More broadly, the insight that the constitutionally specified procedures reflect a balance between federalism and nationalism (or continuity and change) calls into question some of the doctrinal
implications that Clark draws from the constitutional structure. From
the idea that the requirements of bicameralism and presentment were
adopted to protect states from having their laws displaced, Clark
derives rules for construing legislation that has successfully run the
supreme law gauntlet. He argues that, unless the two houses of Congress and the President clearly manifested their decision to displace
state law, federal law should be construed to leave state law standing.13
On this basis, he maintains that the constitutional structure supports
the presumption against preemption.14 I argue in Part II that, if the
constitutional structure reflects a careful balance between federalism
and nationalism, that structure does not support always resolving
ambiguities in favor of the states.
I. THE “SUPREME LAW” GAUNTLET SOMETIMES
SAFEGUARDS NATIONALISM
Although the gauntlet that proposed legislation must run before
it becomes supreme federal law may have operated initially to protect
state law from being displaced, it does not always operate that way.
Assume that a bill establishing a federal contract law successfully runs
12 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008).
13 See Clark, supra note 1, at 1331.
14 See id. at 1338.
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that gauntlet and becomes law.15 Because the process for repealing a
federal law is the same as for creating it in the first place, the requirements of bicameralism and presentment now make it difficult to
restore legislative power over contracts to the states. Whether the
gauntlet at any given moment operates primarily as a safeguard of federalism or of nationalism depends on the extent to which federal law
has already come to predominate over state law, and whether the federal lawmakers are inclined to federalize further or instead to devolve
power to the states. We may already be at the point where federal law
has come to predominate.16 In any event, once a federal law has been
enacted, the gauntlet operates to protect the continued operation of
that law, not to safeguard the continued application of state law.
Clark argues that the role given to the Senate in making supreme
federal law shows a solicitude for state interests, since the Senate was
regarded as the protector of state interests.17 But enactment of a statute also requires the approval of the House of Representatives and the
President (or two-thirds of both houses without the President).18 The
repeal of a federal statute thus requires the approval of the chamber
less solicitous of state interests, contradicting any claim that the constitutional structure consistently operates in favor of the states.
The claim that the supreme law gauntlet safeguards federalism
might have been plausible had our Constitution made it easier to
repeal a federal law than to enact one. With respect to statutes, however, that is clearly not the case. With respect to treaties, the issue is
less settled. When Senator Goldwater challenged President Carter’s
termination of a treaty with Taiwan without the consent of the Senate,
he argued, based on an analogy to statutes, that termination of treaties requires the approval of the same entities that make treaties.19
The Supreme Court dismissed without a majority rationale. A plural15 Assume also that such a law would not otherwise exceed legislative power
under the Constitution. Clark’s structural protection for federalism serves to supplement, not replace, judicial review for conformity with Article I, Section 8. In any
event, a federal contract law would pass muster under United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549 (1995), United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), and Gonzales v. Raich, 545
U.S. 1 (2005), as it would regulate commercial activity.
16 See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND
WECHSLER’S FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 495 (5th ed. 2003) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER] (“[A]t present federal law appears to be more primary than
interstitial in numerous areas.”).
17 See Clark, supra note 1, at 1344.
18 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
19 See Goldwater v. Carter, 481 F. Supp. 949, 950 (D.D.C. 1979) (“Plaintiffs seek to
have this Court declare that the termination of the 1954 Treaty cannot be legally
accomplished . . . without the advice and consent of the United States Senate or the
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ity regarded the issue as a political question.20 If the question is
indeed political, then the question remains open, and the courts will
not give us an answer. More recent presidential treaty terminations,
however, have gone unchallenged.21 Thus, it may be that our Constitution effectively permits the President to terminate a treaty without
the consent of the Senate.
Still, the termination of a treaty could conceivably leave in place a
federal statute, or even another treaty, rather than state law. If the
Constitution were structured to safeguard the operation of state law,
then it would make repeal of a federal statute or treaty easier when it
resulted in devolution of power to the states than when it did not. No
one claims that our Constitution establishes such a rule.
The Constitution might also plausibly be understood to protect
state interests if all federal laws were operative only for a limited
period of time. Such a regime would require the federal government
to run the gauntlet successively in order to retain a preemptive federal
law. But, although federal laws may include sunset provisions, there is
nothing in the Constitution that requires them.
In sum, to the extent that the constitutional requirements for lawmaking make it difficult to enact a federal law, they safeguard the status quo, not federalism. At the start of our history, to safeguard the
approval of both houses of Congress.”), rev’d, 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir. 1979), vacated,
444 U.S. 996 (1979).
20 Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 1002–05 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). In a concurring
opinion, Justice Powell described the issue as not ripe for judicial review because Congress had not confronted the President regarding the termination. “The Judicial
Branch should not decide issues affecting the allocation of power between the President and Congress until the political branches reach a constitutional impasse.” Id. at
997 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice White, dissented in
part. He agreed to grant the petition for certiorari but would have also set the case
for oral argument and given the issues plenary consideration. See id. at 1006 (Blackmun, J., dissenting in part). Justice Brennan argued that the President had power to
terminate the treaty at issue. Noting that “the power to recognize, and withdraw recognition from, foreign regimes” is committed to the President alone, Justice Brennan
viewed the treaty termination as a “necessary incident” to the executive’s recognition
of the People’s Republic of China. See id. at 1007 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The
treaty was based on the “now-abandoned view” that the Taiwan government was
China’s only legitimate regime. See id.
21 President Bush’s recent termination of the Optional Protocol to the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 325, 596 U.N.T.S. 487, which agreed to the compulsory
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice over VCCR disputes, id. art. I, 21
U.S.T. at 326, 596 U.N.T.S. at 488, appears to have generated little constitutional
controversy. The United States withdrew from the protocol on March 7, 2005. See
Philip V. Tisne, The ICJ and Municipal Law: The Precedential Effect of the Avena and
Lagrand Decisions in U.S. Courts, 29 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 865, 865 n.3 (2006).
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status quo was to safeguard federalism. But the two goals are not invariably coextensive. If the Founders did believe, as Clark argues, that
the rules they were adopting would operate to protect state prerogatives, they were only partly right. If we were to deduce the Constitution’s structure and purpose from its bare terms, we would have to
conclude that, insofar as they are onerous, the procedures for enacting supreme federal law operate to safeguard the status quo rather
than federalism.
Clark does not argue that, in light of the Founders’ intent to protect federalism, the Constitution should be read to make it easier to
repeal federal laws than to enact them in the first place. Indeed, I
suspect that Clark would not revise his claim about the exclusivity of
the Constitution’s lawmaking procedures in the slightest in response
to the reality that those procedures sometimes operate to entrench
federal law and hinder a devolution of power to the states. Thus, if he
is right about the Founders’ reasons for adopting those procedures,
then those reasons ultimately do not drive his doctrinal conclusions.
His conclusions would be the same had the Founders adopted these
procedures to safeguard the status quo instead. His structural analysis
is based on the Constitution’s text rather than the Founders’ purposes
in adopting that text.
In my view, Clark would be right to reject constitutional analysis
based on the Founders’ purposes in designing the Constitution’s
structure, as distinguished from the actual structure of the document
they adopted as revealed in its text. An originalism that relies on purposes shorn from text suffers from the same problems as an originalism that relies on the Founders’ expected applications of the
provisions they adopted.22 The Founders (those who spoke up, anyway) might well have believed that the bicameralism and presentment
requirements would operate to safeguard federalism. If so, their
belief was correct for much of our history. They were mistaken, however, if they believed those requirements would always operate to safeguard federalism. Today they will often have the opposite effect.
The Founders’ mistaken expectation that Article I, Section 7
would protect federalism, as distinguished from the status quo, should
carry no doctrinal weight. It provides no support, for example, for
“insist[ing] upon a ‘clear statement’ before . . . constru[ing] a federal
22 For a critique of this approach, see Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291, 295–303 (2007); see also Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism and Its Discontents (Plus a Thought or Two About Abortion) 384 (Univ. of Tex. Sch. of
Law, Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper No. 117, 2007), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=957630 (asserting that almost nobody
embraces the original expected application approach).
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statute to interfere with state governmental functions.”23 On the
other hand, recognition that the difficulty of making federal law
sometimes operates to safeguard nationalism does not, by itself,
require rejection of Clark’s claim about the exclusivity of those procedures. The critiques in Part II have broader implications.
II. THE CONSTITUTION FACILITATES
OF STATE LAW

THE

DISPLACEMENT

Part I established that, to the extent the Constitution makes the
enactment of federal law difficult, it safeguards the status quo, not
necessarily federalism. Part II shows that the Constitution was not just
designed to make the enactment of supreme federal law difficult. In
an important sense, it was also designed to make the enactment of
federal law easy. The Constitution makes federal lawmaking more difficult than it would have been under other conceivable schemes, such
as parliamentary systems like Britain’s. But it also makes federal lawmaking easier than it would have been under other conceivable
schemes. Most relevantly, the Constitution makes displacement of
state law easier than it was under the regime it replaced.
Under the Articles of Confederation, the legislative power of
Congress extended to far fewer matters than under Article I, Section 8
of the Constitution.24 In addition, Congress had the power to requisition from the states the funds necessary to conduct the business of the
Confederation, according to a set formula,25 and to conclude treaties,
23 Clark, supra note 1, at 1425 (describing the clear statement rule of Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 464–70 (1991)).
24 The legislative powers of Congress consisted of the power of “establishing rules
for deciding in all cases, what captures on land or water shall be legal, and in what
manner prizes taken by land or naval forces in the service of the United States shall be
divided or appropriated[, and] granting letters of marque and reprisal in times of
peace” as well as
regulating the alloy and value of coin struck by their own authority, or by
that of the respective States—fixing the standards of weights and measures
throughout the United States—regulating the trade and managing all affairs
with the Indians, not members of any of the States, provided that the legislative right of any State within its own limits be not infringed or violated—
establishing or regulating post offices from one State to another, throughout
all the United States, and exacting such postage on the papers passing
through the same as may be requisite to defray the expenses of the said
office . . . making rules for the government and regulation of the said land
and naval forces, and directing their operations.
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX (U.S. 1781).
25 See id.
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subject to certain limits.26 Congressional action on treaties and most
other “legislative” matters specified in the Articles required the agreement of nine of the thirteen states.27 Congressional action on matters
falling outside Congress’ enumerated powers would have required
amendment of the Articles, which required the consent of all thirteen
states.28 Moreover, acts of Congress operated on the states as corporate bodies rather than the individuals within the states.29 Thus, displacement of state law also required an act of the state legislatures.
The weakness of the national government under the Articles was,
of course, the principal animating cause of the Founders’ decision to
write a new Constitution.30 The Founders’ main purpose was to
strengthen the national government. Perhaps their most important
decision was to empower the national government to act directly upon
individuals, giving the federal legislature a true legislative power for
the first time. With respect to matters within Congress’ enumerated
powers, legislative action became easier insofar as the Constitution
required a simple majority, as opposed to the supermajority required
by the Articles for congressional action on most enumerated mat26 See id. (providing that “no treaty of commerce shall be made whereby the legislative power of the respective States shall be restrained from imposing such imposts
and duties on foreigners, as their own people are subjected to, or from prohibiting
the exportation or importation of any species of goods or commodities whatsoever”).
27 See id.
28 See id. art. XIII.
29 See id. (providing that “[e]very State shall abide by the determination of the
United States in Congress assembled, on all questions which by this confederation are
submitted to them”); see also New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 163 (1992)
(“Under the Articles of Confederation, Congress lacked the authority in most respects
to govern the people directly. In practice, Congress ‘could not directly tax or legislate
upon individuals; it had no explicit legislative or governmental power to make binding law enforceable as such.’ ” (quoting Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism,
96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1447 (1987))).
30 See James McHenry, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (May 29, 1787),
in 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 24, 24–27 (Max Farrand
ed., rev. ed. 1937) [hereinafter FARRAND’S RECORDS] (enumerating the problems of
the Articles of Confederation that the Constitutional Convention aimed to correct,
including the ability of state governments to encroach on national power); see also
James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (July 17, 1787), in 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra, at 25, 27 (“The necessity of a general Govt. proceeds from the
propensity of the States to pursue their particular interests in opposition to the general interest. This propensity will continue to disturb the system, unless effectually
controuled.”); James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (June 8,
1787), in FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra, at 164, 167 (“To correct [the Articles of Confederation’s] vices is the business of this convention. One of its vices is the want of an
effectual controul in the whole over its parts.”).
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ters.31 The Constitution did add to the formal requirements for legislation on enumerated matters by establishing a bicameral legislature
and requiring the approval of the President.32 But Congress’ single
chamber under the Articles was structured like the Senate, as originally established by the Constitution, with legislators chosen by the
state legislatures.33 The single legislative chamber under the Articles
thus resembled the house of Congress designed to be most solicitous
of state interests. In the light of other differences, it is indisputable
that the Constitution made displacement of state law easier overall
than under the Articles. First, the expansion of the proper subjects of
federal legislation meant that, for many of Congress’ most important
powers under the Constitution (such as the power to regulate commerce), Article I, Section 7 replaced an effective requirement of unanimity.34 Second, the power of Congress to make its legislation
operative directly on individuals dispensed with the need for action by
the state legislatures. Finally, by creating a judicial mechanism for
enforcing such legislation, the Constitution significantly increased the
efficacy of any federal decision to displace state law.
Of course, the Founders did not want to make it too easy to displace state law. But neither did they want to make it too hard. The
Founders sought to strike a balance. They selected a set of procedures that they regarded as making it neither too easy nor too hard to
do so. For example, although they viewed the Senate as, to some
extent, a protector of state interests, they also rejected proposals that
would have tied the Senate too directly to state legislatures.35
31 Compare ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX (U.S. 1781) (“The United States
assembled in Congress shall never [exercise most enumerated powers] unless nine
States assent to the same”), with U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (enumerating the powers of
Congress without imposing a supermajority voting requirement).
32 The Articles established a unicameral Congress, see ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. V (U.S. 1781), and no separate executive branch.
33 See id.
34 Compare ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX (U.S. 1781) (enumerating limited
congressional powers, see supra note 24), and id. art. XIII (“[N]or shall any alteration
at any time hereafter be made in any of them; unless such alteration be agreed to in a
Congress of the United States, and be afterwards confirmed by the legislatures of
every State”), with U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (enumerating the powers of Congress under
the Constitution, including the power to “to regulate Commerce” and to “make all
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing
Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the
United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof”).
35 On June 26, 1787, delegates to the Constitutional Convention dismissed proposals that would have tied senators more directly to the states they represented. Oliver Ellsworth proposed that states, rather than the nation, should pay their senators.
See James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (June 26, 1787), in 1
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If the Constitution reflects a careful balance of federalism and
nationalism, then, just as it would be illegitimate for courts to recognize a category of federal law created through procedures less onerous than those contemplated by the Constitution, it would also be
illegitimate for the courts to impose obstacles to federal lawmaking
not contemplated in the Constitution. Although the proposition
seems straightforward, the case law does not always accord with it. In
Part II.A, I discuss one recent Supreme Court decision that appears to
violate the principle that courts may not add to the Constitution’s
requirements for making supreme federal law, or subtract from the
preemptive force of such law once made. In Part II.B, I consider how
some of Clark’s doctrinal claims fare when account is taken of the
idea that the Constitution’s lawmaking provisions reflect a balance
between federalist and nationalist objectives.
A. Non-Self-Execution of Treaties as Illegitimate Imposition of Additional
Obstacles to Supreme Federal Lawmaking
If the constitutional requirements for creating supreme federal
law reflect a balance between federalism and nationalism, then it is
just as illegitimate for the courts to impose additional obstacles to federal lawmaking, or to subtract from the preemptive force of supreme
federal law once made, as it is for them to make it easier to create
such law or to add to its preemptive force. Yet, with respect to treaties,
the Supreme Court appears to have imposed obstacles to supreme
federal lawmaking not found in the Constitution. Despite the
Supremacy Clause’s declaration that “all Treaties” are the “supreme
Law of the Land,”36 the Court’s recent decision in Medellı́n maintains
that only some treaties have that status.37 Moreover, the majority in
Medellı́n appears to have endorsed an approach under which very few
FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 30, at 421, 427. James Madison argued against the
proposal, noting that it would make the Senate “the mere Agents & Advocates of State
interests & views, instead of being the impartial umpires & Guardians of justice and
general Good.” Id. at 428. Madison’s vision of impartial, national senators prevailed
in this regard when Ellsworth’s motion failed. See id. Similarly, General Charles
Pinckney argued that senators should serve only four year terms, so that they would
not “settle in the State where they exercised their functions; and would in a little time
be rather the representatives of that than of the State appoint’g them.” Id. at 421.
For an analysis holding that the rejection of these proposals meant “[t]he Senate itself
would embody the mixed character of the Constitution,” see JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS 170–71 (1996).
36 U.S. CONST. art. VI., cl. 2.
37 Medellı́n v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1356–57 n.2 (2008).
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treaties will have the force of domestic law, let alone supreme federal
law.38
Treaties are contracts between nations imposing obligations that
are binding on nations as a matter of international law.39 General
international law does not dictate the status of treaties under the
domestic law of any given state.40 To say that a treaty has the force of
law in a nation is to assign the responsibility for achieving compliance
with the treaty among various types of officials of the nation—legislative, executive, and judicial.41 Because different nations assign the
responsibilities for law enforcement differently among different sorts
of officials, if international law did specify that a treaty should have
the force of domestic law the consequence would be to assign responsibilities to different sorts of officials in different nations.42 For this
reason, international law generally insists only that states comply with
their international law obligations (including those having their
source in a treaty).43 It generally leaves it to the domestic law of each
nation to determine the status as domestic law of the nation’s obligations under international law.44 This is the meaning of the idea that
international law is generally concerned with ends and not means.45
In some countries, treaties never have the force of domestic law
until implemented by the legislature. This is the case in the United
Kingdom.46 Under the (unwritten) constitution of that country, trea38 See id. at 1356–67.
39 See 1 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW § 582, at 1199–203 (Robert Jennings &
Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992).
40 See id. § 21, at 82.
41 See id. at 82–86.
42 See id.
43 See id. at 83.
44 See id.
45 See, e.g., IAN BROWNLIE, STATE RESPONSIBILITY: PART I, at 241 (1983); 1 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 39, § 21, at 82–83 (“From the standpoint of
international law states are generally free as to the manner in which, domestically,
they put themselves in the position to meet their international obligations; the choice
between the direct reception and application of international law, or its transformation into national law by way of statute, is a matter of indifference, as is the choice
between the various forms of legislation, common law, or administrative action as the
means of giving effect to international obligations. These are matters for each state to
determine for itself according to its own constitutional practices.”); Pierre-Marie
Dupuy, Reviewing the Difficulties of Codification: On Ago’s Classification of Obligations of
Means and Obligations of Result in Relation to State Responsibility, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 371,
375–82 (1999).
46 See Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause and
the Presumption of Self Execution, 122 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at
15–16), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1118063.
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ties are made by the Crown, but the making of domestic law requires
the assent of Parliament.47 That is the rule that the United States
would have inherited had the Founders not adopted a different one.48
But the Founders did adopt a different rule, which they enshrined in
the Supremacy Clause’s declaration that “all Treaties” are the
“supreme Law of the Land.”49 The Constitution takes the international obligations created by our treaties and gives them the force of
domestic law, thus implicitly directing all law-applying officials to
apply them as they do other forms of law. This includes executive
officials, who are obligated to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed,”50 and judges, whose job is to decide cases in accordance
with the law and, in the process, to “say what the law is.”51 With
respect to state judges, the Supremacy Clause does not leave the matter to implication. It expressly directs them to apply treaties, notwithstanding anything in the constitutions or laws of the states.52
Over the years a distinction has developed between treaties that
are self-executing and treaties that are not. Non-self-executing treaties are not enforceable in the courts without prior legislative implementation.53 Because such treaties appear to lack the usual attributes
of supreme federal law, some courts and commentators have suggested that such treaties lack the force of domestic law. That view,
however, is contradicted by the plain text of the Supremacy Clause. In
past work, I have attempted to reconcile the concept of a non-selfexecuting treaty with the Supremacy Clause’s declaration that “all
Treaties” are the “supreme Law of the Land.”54 I have argued that the
term non-self-executing has been used to describe treaties that are not
enforceable in court for a variety of reasons compatible (to varying
degrees) with the Supremacy Clause’s designation of treaties as
supreme federal law.55
Some non-self-executing treaties are not judicially enforceable
because they purport to accomplish what, under our constitutional
47 See id.
48 See id. (manuscript at 16–19).
49 U.S. CONST. art. VI., cl. 2. For a discussion of the Framers’ reasons for taking
this step and the ramifications of this decision, see Vázquez, supra note 46 (manuscript at 19–28).
50 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
51 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
52 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
53 See Carlos Manuel Vázquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J.
INT’L L. 695, 695 (1995).
54 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
55 See Vázquez, supra note 53, at 722–23.
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system, can be accomplished only by statute.56 Examples include the
appropriation of money57 and the criminalization of conduct.58 To
the extent that they purport to accomplish what may only be done by
statute, they are unconstitutional. They are non-self-executing by
operation of the Constitution because they impose international obligations that, under our Constitution, may be fulfilled only through
legislation.
Other non-self-executing treaties are not judicially enforceable
because they raise nonjusticiable questions.59 Like statutes and constitutional provisions that raise political questions, these treaties impose
obligations requiring judgments clearly for nonjudicial discretion.
Treaties falling into this category include those that call on the parties
to use their best efforts to accomplish certain ends,60 or those that are
otherwise too vague for judicial enforcement.61 Treaties in this cate56
57

See id. at 718–19.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 111 cmt. i (1987). But see Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM. J.
INT’L L. 760, 775, 778, 780–81 (1988).
58 See Hopson v. Kreps, 622 F.2d 1375, 1380 (9th Cir. 1980) (“Treaty regulations
that penalize individuals . . . are generally considered to require domestic legislation
before they are given any effect.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 111 cmt. i (1987); Yuji Iwasawa, The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties in the United States: A Critical Analysis, 26 VA. J. INT’L L. 627, 676 n.239
(1986). But see Paust, supra note 57, at 775, 780. In The Over the Top, 5 F.2d 838 (D.
Conn. 1925), the court said that “[i]t is not the function of treaties to enact the fiscal
or criminal law of a nation. For this purpose no treaty is self-executing.” Id. at 845.
59 See Vázquez, supra note 53, at 710–18.
60 See INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 428–29 n.22 (1984) (describing Article 34 of the
Refugee Convention as “precatory and not self-executing”); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab
Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 809 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring) (“Articles 1 and 2
[of the United Nations Charter] contain general ‘purposes and principles,’ some of
which state mere aspirations and none of which can sensibly be thought to have been
intended to be judicially enforceable at the behest of individuals.”); Sei Fujii v. State,
242 P.2d 617, 619 n.2 (Cal. 1952) (en banc) (holding that a United Nations Charter
provision requiring states to “promot[e] and encourag[e] respect for human rights”
was not self-executing).
61 See Diggs v. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (holding a Security
Council Resolution not self-executing because it “does not provide specific standards”); Saipan v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 502 F.2d 90, 99 (9th Cir. 1974) (asking
whether the Trusteeship Agreement over the Pacific Islands was “too vague for judicial enforcement”); Greenpeace USA v. Stone, 748 F. Supp. 749, 767 (D. Haw. 1990)
(citing the lack of “standards or procedures to judicially enforce the treaty”); Am.
Baptist Churches in the U.S.A. v. Meese, 712 F. Supp. 756, 770 (S.D. Cal. 1989) (holding that Article 1 of the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War was not self-executing because “[t]he language used does not
impose any specific obligations on the signatory nations,” and therefore did not provide “any intelligible guidelines for judicial enforcement”).
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gory are the law of the land, but they are not judicially enforceable
because of a constitutional disability of the courts. In this respect,
they do not differ from statutory and constitutional provisions raising
nonjusticiable questions.62
Still other treaties have been described as non-self-executing
because they do not confer a private right of action.63 Such treaties
are not, for that reason, entirely unenforceable in court.64 They may
be enforceable defensively or through rights of action having their
basis in other laws.65 In the absence of another basis for the right of
action, a party seeking affirmative relief on the basis of a treaty that is
non-self-executing in this sense may find himself unable to prevail.66
Still, a treaty that is non-self-executing in this sense is the supreme law
of the land, just as a statute that does not confer a private right of
action is.67
The fourth category of non-self-executing treaty is the most difficult to reconcile with the constitutional text. Treaties in this category
are non-self-executing because of what the treaty itself has to say about
the need for legislative implementation. The Supreme Court recognized this category in Foster v. Neilson,68 which involved a treaty with
Spain providing that the United States “shall ratify and confirm” certain grants of land that the Spanish crown had made to its subjects
before ceding sovereignty to the United States.69 The Court read this
language to contemplate future acts of legislation ratifying and confirming the grants. It said that the treaty would have been self-executing if it had provided that the grants “shall be valid” or that they were
“hereby” confirmed.70 Because the treaty said instead that the grants
“shall be ratified and confirmed,” it was “addresse[d]” to the political
branches and had to be executed by those branches before it could be
given effect by the courts.71
Because treaties that are non-self-executing in this sense lack
most of the usual attributes of law, it has been said that such treaties
impose international obligations that do not have the force of domes62 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
63 See Vázquez, supra note 53, at 719–22.
64 See id. at 719.
65 See id. at 719–20.
66 See id. at 720.
67 See id.
68 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829).
69 See id. at 253–54; Carlos M. Vázquez, Foster v. Neilson and United States v.
Percheman: Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, in INTERNATIONAL LAW STORIES 151, 152–58
(John E. Noyes et al. eds., 2007).
70 Foster, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 314.
71 Id. at 314–15.
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tic law.72 This idea appears to be based on a negative inference from
the Supreme Court’s dictum in Foster that treaties are the equivalent
of an act of the legislature if they are self-executing.73 However, the
claim that non-self-executing treaties impose international obligations
that lack the force of domestic law is directly contradicted by the text
of the Supremacy Clause, which establishes that “all Treaties” are the
“supreme Law of the Land.”74
Although in tension with the Supremacy Clause, the Foster category of non-self-executing treaties might have been reconciled with
that Clause on the ground that such treaties are by their terms
“addressed to” Congress. Treaties that are unconstitutional or nonjusticiable are addressed to Congress by virtue of the Constitution. Fostertype non-self-executing treaties are “addressed to” Congress by virtue
of the treaty itself.75 Foster, on this view, recognizes that the parties to
a treaty can render it non-self-executing by formulating the obligation
as one addressed to the legislature. Such treaties are analogous to
statutes that instruct an executive agency to enact regulations on a
72 The statement that non-self-executing treaties lack the force of domestic law
has been repeated (without analysis) in lower-court cases, articles, and books. For a
small sampling, see ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 162 n.21 (2d Cir. 2007)
(“Non-self-executing treaties do not become effective as domestic law until implementing legislation is enacted.”); Payne-Barahona v. Gonzáles, 474 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir.
2007) (“The treaties . . . have been held to be non-self executing . . . . They thus do
not have the force of domestic law.”); Fund for Animals, Inc., v. Kempthorne, 472
F.3d 872, 879 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“Like statutes, self-executing treaties automatically become part of domestic American law. By contrast, nonself-executing treaties have no effect or force as a matter of domestic law (though
Congress may choose to incorporate parts of non-self-executing treaties into domestic
law by enacting implementing statutes).”); Renkel v. United States, 456 F.3d 640, 643
(6th Cir. 2006) (“ ‘[N]on-self-executing’ treaties do require domestic legislation to
have the force of law.”); SUE DAVIS, CORWIN AND PELTASON’S UNDERSTANDING THE CONSTITUTION 198 (17th ed. 2008); LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION 198–209 (2d ed. 1996); Alona E. Evans, Some Aspects of the Problem of Self-Executing Treaties, 45 PROC. AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 66, 68 (1951); Geoffrey R.
Watson, The Death of Treaty, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 781, 831 (1994). Compare Trans World
Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 252 (1984) (concluding that
because “the [Warsaw] Convention is a self-executing treaty,” “no domestic legislation
is required to give [it] the force of law in the United States”), with United States v.
Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 667 (1992) (suggesting that a treaty’s self-executing
character and its having “the force of law” are separate questions).
73 See Foster, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 314; cf. Medellı́n v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1356,
1362–63 (2008) (citing Foster for the proposition that non-self-executing treaties lack
the force of domestic law).
74 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
75 For elaboration of this thesis, see Vázquez, supra note 46 (manuscript at
38–39).
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given subject according to specified guidelines. Until the agency
enacts the regulations, the contemplated beneficiaries of the regulations would not be able to maintain a suit based on the contemplated
regulations. The statute is “addressed to” the executive branch, and
thus the executive must execute it before individuals may rely on it in
court. (The difference between a statute addressed to the executive
and a treaty addressed to Congress—and the reason the latter is somewhat more difficult to square with the Supremacy Clause—is that, in
the former case, it may be possible for an individual to come into
court to require the executive to pass the regulations,76 or to challenge the regulations as contrary to the statute.77 In the case of a
treaty “addressed to” the legislature, there is no possibility of maintaining an action in court to force Congress to enact the required
legislation, or to challenge an implementing statute as contrary to the
treaty.78)
If Foster-type non-self-execution is to be reconciled with the
Supremacy Clause on the ground that the treaty itself contemplates
implementing legislation, there obviously must be evidence in the
treaty itself that the parties contemplated the enactment of implementing legislation. In the absence of such evidence, the Supremacy
Clause by its terms would obligate judges to give effect to the treaty.
(When a court gives effect to a treaty because it is instructed to do so
by a statute, it is applying the statute, not the treaty.) On this basis, I
have argued that the Supremacy Clause should be understood to
establish a presumption that treaties are self-executing.79
In its recent decision in Medellı́n, the Supreme Court obviated
any attempt to reconcile the concept of a non-self-executing treaty
with the constitutional text by, for the first time, endorsing the view
76 See Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552b(g) (2000) (“Any person
may bring a proceeding in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to require an agency to promulgate such regulations if such agency has not
promulgated such regulations within the time period specified herein.”); Rushforth v.
Council of Econ. Advisers, 762 F.2d 1038, 1038–39 (1985) (challenging the Council
of Economic Advisers for not promulgating regulations under the Sunshine Act).
77 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9
(1984) (“The judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction and
must reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear congressional
intent.”).
78 Except, perhaps, if implementation of the treaty is the sole constitutional basis
for the statute and the claim is that the statute goes beyond what the treaty authorizes.
Cf. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433–34 (1920) (holding that statutes implementing treaties may be valid even if they would not otherwise fall within the federal
legislative power under Article I).
79 See Vázquez, supra note 46.
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that a non-self-executing treaty simply lacks the force of domestic
law.80 In so doing, the Court has placed an entire category of treaties
of the United States—treaties that are valid and in force and impose
obligations as a matter of international law—beyond the scope of the
Supremacy Clause, directly contradicting that Clause’s text, which
gives domestic legal force to all treaties. Treaties in this category will
have the preemptive force of federal law only if they run through two
of the three gauntlets specified in the Constitution for creating
supreme federal law, rather than the usual one.
Requiring treaties to run through two gauntlets might be defensible if there were affirmative evidence that the parties intended that
the obligations established by the treaty would be subject to legislative
implementation. But the self-execution test applied by the majority
appears to presume that a treaty is not self-executing unless there is
affirmative evidence that the parties intended that the treaty have
domestic legal force.81 According to the Supreme Court, a treaty is
self-executing only if “the treaty itself conveys an intention that it be

80 Medellı́n v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1356 n.2 (2008).
81 At a number of points in the opinion, the Court focuses on the intent of the
President and/or the Senate, see id. at 1358–60, 1362, 1364, 1366–67, suggesting that
the relevant intent is that of the United States treatymakers. On the other hand, the
majority’s focus on the text of the treaty (and its criticism of the dissent for failing to
focus on the text) indicates that the relevant intent is that of the parties to the treaty.
See id. at 1362 (referring to “our obligation to interpret treaty provisions to determine
whether they are self-executing” (emphasis added)). Indeed, even when it refers to
the intent of the President and/or the Senate, the majority focuses on their intent as
reflected in the treaty’s text. See id. at 1364 (“[W]e have held treaties to be self-executing when the textual provisions indicate that the President and Senate intended for
the agreement to have domestic effect.” (emphasis added)); id. at 1366 (“Our cases
simply require courts to decide whether a treaty’s terms reflect a determination by the
President who negotiated it and the Senate that confirmed it that the treaty has
domestic effect.” (emphasis added)). But cf. id. at 1367 (referring to the intent of the
President and Senate as reflected in “the text, background, negotiating and drafting
history, or practice among signatory nations”). Whether a statement that a treaty is
self-executing would satisfy the majority’s test if it appeared in the executive branch
documents submitting the treaty to the Senate, or in the Senate Report consenting to
the treaty, or in a declaration attached to the instruments of ratification, remains to
be seen. Cf. Vázquez, supra note 46 (manuscript at 48–69) (concluding that a declaration attached to instruments of ratification declaring an otherwise self-executing
treaty to be non-self-executing would be valid and effective). Giving legal effect to an
“intent” by the President and/or the Senate on an issue not addressed by the treaty
itself would appear to violate the constitutional structure as understood by Clark, as it
would give the effect of federal law to something that is not a statute, treaty, or constitutional amendment. See id. (manuscript at 68–69).
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‘self-executing’ and is ratified on these terms.”82 Since the Court has
defined a non-self-executing treaty as one that lacks the force of
domestic law,83 the majority seems to be saying that a treaty does not
have the force of domestic law unless “the treaty itself” discloses an
intent that the treaty have the force of domestic law.84 Thus, the
majority indicates later in the opinion that a treaty is non-self-executing if it “is ratified without provisions clearly according it domestic
effect.”85
If this is the test, then very few, if any, treaties will pass it. As
noted above, under the constitutional rule of some nations, treaties
never have the force of domestic law.86 They always require implementation by statute. Treaties between the United States and such
nations will therefore never reflect a mutual intent that the treaty be
effective as domestic law. For the same reason, multilateral treaties
will rarely, if ever, include language reflecting an intent that the treaty
be directly effective as domestic law. Multilateral treaties are negotiated by numerous states and are written in language that would be
suitable for all. Because of the diversity of constitutional rules on the
domestic effect of treaties, nations negotiating treaties generally do
not address the issue of domestic legal force in the treaties they negotiate. They leave the question to the domestic law of the states’ parties.87 Our domestic law is the Supremacy Clause, which specifies that
treaties have the force of domestic law and instructs judges to give
them effect. If the Medellı́n Court has interpreted the Clause to give
domestic force only to treaties that affirmatively convey an intent that
the treaty have the force of domestic law, then, through a sort of interpretive renvoi, it has read treaties out of the Supremacy Clause.
It is true that a treaty need not impose parallel obligations on all
parties. Thus, there could conceivably be a bilateral treaty that speci82 Medellı́n, 128 S. Ct. at 1356 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)
(“In sum, while treaties ‘may comprise international commitments . . . they are not
domestic law unless Congress has either enacted implementing statutes or the treaty
itself conveys an intention that it be “self-executing” and is ratified on these terms.’ ”
(alteration in original) (quoting Igartúa-De La Rosa v. United States, 417 F.3d 145,
150 (1st Cir. 2005) (en banc))).
83 Id. at 1356 n.2.
84 See id. at 1362.
85 Id. at 1369; see also id. at 1364 (“[W]e have held treaties to be self-executing
when the textual provisions indicate that the President and Senate intended for the
agreement to have domestic effect.”); id. at 1366 (“Our cases simply require courts to
decide whether a treaty’s terms reflect a determination by the President who negotiated it and the Senate that confirmed it that the treaty has domestic effect.”).
86 See supra notes 46–47 and accompanying text.
87 See 1 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 39, at 1199–203.
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fies that the United States’ obligation shall have direct effect as
domestic law, even if the obligations of the other parties do not. With
respect to multilateral treaties, however, this option is effectively
unavailable. Multilateral treaties would consequently never have the
force of domestic law under the test the Court appears to have
endorsed. Bilateral treaties would have the effect of domestic law,
under this test, only if the parties took the unusual step of deciding to
address the issue of the treaty’s domestic legal force.
In any event, this approach would require the treaty parties to
include language in the treaty itself to do the work that the Supremacy
Clause purports to do. If this is what the majority has in mind, it has
rewritten the Supremacy Clause as giving treatymakers the power to
give treaties the force of domestic law.88 But the Clause is not written
that way. The Constitution gives the President the power to make
treaties, with the advice and consent of the Senate,89 but the
Supremacy Cause gives the force of domestic law to “all” the treaties
they make.90
The Court may have believed that such a rewriting of the Clause
was justified on the theory that the greater power not to conclude the
treaty at all includes the lesser power to conclude the treaty but deny
it the force of domestic law. By analogy, it might be argued, Congress’
greater power to enact laws (or not) includes the lesser power to pass
nonbinding resolutions and the like.91 But non-self-executing treaties
are not analogous to nonbinding resolutions. Congress’ power to pass
the latter would be analogous to the President’s power to sign nonbinding United Nations declarations or resolutions (which no one
claims have the force of domestic law). But treaties that are thought
to be non-self-executing under Foster are unquestionably binding
under international law. That was true of the treaty provision involved
in Medellı́n, pursuant to which the United States “under[took] to comply with” the judgments of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in
cases in which it was a party.92 The Supreme Court in Medellı́n recognized that this provision was binding under international law,93 yet it
88 See Carlos Manuel Vázquez, The “Self-Executing” Character of the Refugee Protocol’s
Nonrefoulement Obligation, 7 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 39, 46 (1993).
89 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
90 Id. art. VI, § 2.
91 Nick Rosenkranz, Assoc. Professor of Law, Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr., Comments from the Federalist Society Online Debate of Medellı́n v. Texas, Part I: SelfExecution (Mar. 28, 2008), http://www.fed-soc.org/debates/dbtid.17/default.asp.
92 Medellı́n v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1354 (2008) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
93 Id. at 1356.
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held that the provision lacked the force of domestic law. That holding cannot be squared with the constitutional text.
There is, moreover, an important difference between treaties and
statutes. Statutes create obligations only under United States law.
They derive whatever force they have as law exclusively from the
Supremacy Clause’s declaration that they are the supreme law of the
land.94 Treaties, by contrast, also exist on the international plane.
Even when they lack the force of domestic law, they impose obligations on the nation that are binding under international law. Their
violation can have severe consequences for the nation on the international plane. The Founders were very concerned about those consequences. It was to avert those consequences that they gave treaties the
force of domestic law and instructed judges to give them effect.95 The
Supremacy Clause takes those binding international obligations and
gives them the force of domestic law. The greater power not to conclude the treaty at all does not include the power to conclude the
treaty and deny it the force of domestic law. The Founders may well
have preferred no treaty at all to a treaty that was more likely to be
violated and thus to embroil the nation in international controversy.96
Recognizing the clear purport of the Supremacy Clause’s text,
the Supreme Court has often enforced treaties as domestic law “without provisions clearly according [them] domestic effect.” Indeed, the
Court’s very first important treaty case is flatly inconsistent with the
test suggested by the parts of the Medellı́n opinion quoted above. Ware
v. Hylton97 involved a provision of the Treaty of Peace with Great Britain to the effect that “‘[i]t is agreed that creditors, on either side, shall
meet with no lawful impediment to the recovery of the full value in
sterling money of all bona fide debts heretofore contracted.’”98 As
Justice Iredell recognized, that provision would not have been effective as domestic law in Great Britain because of that nation’s constitutional rule requiring implementing legislation for all treaties.99 There
could accordingly have been no mutual intent to give this mutual obli94 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
95 See Vázquez, supra note 46 (manuscript at 19–21); Carlos Manuel Vázquez,
Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies of Individuals, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1082, 1097–114
(1992) [hereinafter Vázquez, Treaty-Based Rights].
96 Cf. James Madison, Notes on the Federal Convention (Aug. 23, 1787), in 2
FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 30, at 384, 393 (noting that “Gouverneur Morris was
“not solicitous to multiply & facilitate Treaties” as “[t]he more difficulty in making
treaties, the more value will be set on them”).
97 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796).
98 Id. at 239 (opinion of Chase, J.) (emphases omitted) (quoting the Definitive
Treaty of Peace, art. 4, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Sept. 3, 1783, 8 Stat. 80, 82).
99 See id. at 276–77 (opinion of Iredell, J.).
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gation the force of domestic law. Indeed, as Justice Iredell further
recognized, at the time the United States entered into this treaty, it
followed the British rule concerning the domestic effect of treaties.100
Thus, even if the identical provision of a treaty could be read to reflect
an intent to establish a domestically effective obligation for one party
but not the other, this particular provision could not have reflected an
intent that the provision have the force of domestic law for the United
States. It was not until the Constitution was adopted, well after the
conclusion of the Treaty of Peace, that it became possible for the
United States to conclude treaties having the force of domestic law.101
The Medellı́n Court’s suggestion that a treaty has the force of domestic
law only if its terms disclose an intent that it be directly effective as
domestic law is inconsistent not just with Ware, but also with the many
Supreme Court cases applying multilateral treaties as domestic law
even though the United Kingdom and other states following the British approach to treaties were parties.102 Such treaties could not have
been intended by the parties to be directly effective as domestic law.
Foster gives United States treatymakers a mechanism for entering
into a treaty “addressed to” the legislature. They can do so, with the
agreement of the other parties, by formulating the treaty as an obligation subject to legislative implementation.103 If the treaty was so
framed, it might plausibly be regarded as a treaty that is “addressed
to” the legislature by virtue of the treaty itself. As such, the treaty
would be the “law of the land,” but it would be a law addressed to
Congress, which the courts may not enforce because the courts lack
the power to order Congress to legislate.104 It would be an odd sort of
law in our constitutional system—a “law” addressed to the
lawmaker.105 Still, if limited to treaties that affirmatively reflect the
parties’ intent that the treaty’s obligations are subject to legislative
implementation, the Foster concept of a non-self-executing treaty
could be reconciled with the Supremacy Clause.
The Court in Medellı́n made no attempt at such a reconciliation.
It instead decreed that non-self-executing treaties lack the force of
100 See id.
101 See id. at 272 (“The present Constitution of the United States, affords the first
instance of any government [saying] treaties should be the Supreme law of the
land . . . .”).
102 See Vázquez, supra note 46 (manuscript at 40 n.191).
103 For elaboration, see id. (manuscript at 43–48).
104 Cf. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 975 (1997) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(“[T]he essence of legislative power, within the limits of legislative jurisdiction, is a
discretion not subject to command.”).
105 See Vázquez, supra note 46 (manuscript at 39).

R

R

\\server05\productn\N\NDL\83-4\NDL412.txt

2008]

unknown

Seq: 23

a safeguard of nationalism

30-JUL-08

9:34

1623

domestic law.106 Apparently, the Clause does not extend to such treaties, notwithstanding its all-encompassing language. Because the
domestic legal force of the treaty is virtually never a subject that the
parties address in the treaty itself, the test the Court appears to have
endorsed in Medellı́n virtually reads the reference to treaties out of the
Supremacy Clause, at least with respect to existing treaties. With
respect to future treaties, this approach illegitimately adds to the
requirements for supreme federal lawmaking to the extent it recognizes such force only if the United States treatymakers succeed in
obtaining the parties’ agreement to language reflecting an intent to
give the treaty domestic legal force,107 something that is a practicable
option only for treaties with few parties.
In response to arguments by the dissent, the majority denied that
its test would result in no treaties being self-executing.108 Presumably,
the recognition that the portions of the opinion quoted above would
conflict with Supreme Court decisions stretching back to Ware, and
with its own denial that it meant to deny all treaties domestic legal
force, will dissuade the Court from following the implications of its
analysis. The quoted language appears to have been unnecessary to
the majority’s conclusions, given its reliance elsewhere in the opinion
on narrower grounds for concluding that Article 94 was not self-executing.109 One hopes that the majority will clarify that it did not
intend such a dramatic departure from constitutional text, structure,
and doctrine. (It is noteworthy that the decision’s early defenders
have not read it to create a presumption against self-execution.)110
Still, the casualness with which the majority was willing to adopt a view
so directly contrary to the Supremacy Clause’s text indicates that the
Court has yet to internalize the illegitimacy of adding to the procedures set forth in the Constitution for making supreme federal law, or
106 See Medellı́n v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1367 n.2 (2008).
107 See id. at 1357–61.
108 See id. at 1365.
109 See, e.g., id. at 1360 (relying on the fact that Mr. Medellı́n was not a party to the
ICJ’s judgment); id. at 1372–74 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
110 See Posting of Julian Ku to Opinio Juris, http://www.opiniojuris.org/posts/12
06464651.shtml (Mar. 25, 2008, 13:04); Rosenkranz, supra note 91; Posting of Paul
Stephan to Opinio Juris, http://www.opiniojuris.org/posts/1206470637.shtml (Mar.
25, 2008, 14:43); Posting of Mark Weisburd to Opinio Juris, http://www.opiniojuris.
org/posts/1206547402.shtml (Mar. 26, 2008, 12:03); Posting of Ernie Young to
Opinio Juris, http://www.opiniojuris.org/posts/1206477292.shtml (Mar. 25, 2008,
16:36). But cf. Posting of Mike Dorf to Dorf on Law, http://michaeldorf.org/2008/
03/more-medellin-musings.html (Mar. 26, 2008 13:33) (referring to “the majority’s
presumption that, absent language to the contrary, a treaty should be deemed nonself-executing”).
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subtracting from the preemptive force of supreme federal law once
made.
B. Broader Doctrinal Implications of Adding a Nationalist Perspective
Recognition that the constitutional structure reflects a balance
between federalism and nationalism also calls into question some doctrinal prescriptions that Clark has drawn from the constitutional structure. Most of those prescriptions are based on the following line of
reasoning: the Constitution protects federalism by making it difficult
to enact federal law; the procedures set up by the Constitution seek to
ensure that state law is not displaced unless a majority of both houses
plus the President (or two-thirds of both houses without the President) affirmatively agree to such displacement; therefore, federal
enactments should be construed not to displace state law unless they
clearly reflect the lawmakers’ intent to do so. This reasoning is the
basis, for example, for Clark’s argument that the presumption against
preemption is required by the constitutional structure.111 Unless
there is clear, affirmative evidence that both houses and the President
intended to preempt state law, federal law should be interpreted to
leave state law in place. Clark makes a similar argument in defense of
the Court’s current restrictive approach to the implication of private
rights of action under federal statutes.112
In short, Clark reads the Constitution to make application of state
law the default and to require specific and affirmative evidence in the
federal enactment of an intent to replace the default rule. Clark thus
argues that the Constitution’s structure not only requires an enactment under Article I, Section 7 or a treaty under Article II, but also
has implications for how such enactments should be interpreted.
Because the Founders imposed these requirements in order to protect
state interests, Clark argues, in effect, that all ambiguities in such
enactments should be interpreted in favor of the continued application of state law.
In Part I, I noted that the supreme law gauntlet favors the status
quo, not necessarily the continued application of state law. Clark
could respond by broadening his doctrinal prescription to maintain
that federal statutes should be read not to alter the status quo in the
absence of clear evidence of an intent to change the status quo. Alternatively, he might limit his doctrinal prescriptions to situations in
which protecting the status quo also protects federalism. In this subpart, I argue that neither the narrower nor the broader doctrinal pre111
112

See Clark, supra note 1, at 1427–30.
See id. at 1423–24.
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scriptions are required by the Constitution’s specification of
mechanisms for creating supreme federal law, or the Founders’ reasons for adopting those mechanisms.
Specifically, as discussed above, the Founders did not just want to
make federal lawmaking difficult, they also wanted to make it easier.113 They did not want to make it too easy to alter the status quo,
but neither did they want to make it too difficult. Insofar as the status
quo was state law, they created procedural obstacles to displacing such
law, but they removed other, more formidable obstacles. The resulting scheme thus reflects a balance between federalism (or the status
quo) and nationalism (or change).
It follows that the constitutional structure does not support doctrinal rules that reflexively favor the status quo in the event of textual
ambiguity. Resolution of such ambiguities requires resort to a theory
for interpreting the output of the Constitution’s process for creating
supreme federal law. The constitutional structure, as such, cannot
supply the content of such interpretive rules. The structure tells us
that the legal status quo remains unaffected if a federal statute or
treaty, interpreted pursuant to the proper approach to statute or
treaty interpretation, does not alter the legal status quo. Because the
constitutional structure reflects a balance between the status quo and
change, it does not support the conclusion that ambiguities in the text
must be resolved against change.
Again, the clearest example concerns treaties. Treaties are instruments of international law, and there is a well-developed international
law of treaty interpretation.114 Presumably, the Founders expected
that treaties would be interpreted in accordance with those rules. In
any event, the federal courts apply these rules in interpreting United
States treaties.115 Whatever else we might say about these rules, it is
113 See supra notes 24–35 and accompanying text.
114 The basic rules are now codified in Articles 29–32 of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 29–32,
opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 339–40. Although the United
States is not a party to the Convention, it regards most of its provisions as reflective of
customary international law. See Curtis A. Bradley, Unratified Treaties, Domestic Politics,
and the U.S. Constitution, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 307, 314 (2007); David S. Jonas, The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: Current Legal Status in the United States and the Implications of a Nuclear Test Explosion, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1007, 1031–32 (2007).
115 See Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 271 (1890) (“[I]n their construction words
[in a treaty] are to be taken in their ordinary meaning, as understood in the public
law of nations, and not in any artificial or special sense impressed upon them by local
law, unless such restricted sense is clearly intended.”). The reference to the public
law of nations “seems to be a reminder that terms of art are to be construed in view of
international usages and customary international law, not domestic constructions.”
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clear that they do not turn in the slightest on the United States Constitution’s original structure with respect to the making of treaties or
other forms of supreme federal law. Some scholars argue that these
rules leave no gaps—in other words, that the international law of
treaty interpretation tells us exactly how to interpret ambiguities left
by the treaty’s text.116 If so, then there is clearly no room for an interpretive presumption based on the Constitution’s specification of only
three mechanisms for preempting state law.
If the international law rules of treaty interpretation do leave
gaps, then the United States would be free to develop rules of interpretation for filling in such gaps. Our interpretive gap-filling rules
could take into account our constitutional structure. In the past, the
courts have filled these gaps by interpreting treaties generously in
favor of those claiming rights under them,117 an approach that
accords with one of the purposes for giving treaties the status of
supreme federal law—the avoidance of international friction that
would be caused by treaty violations.118 The courts have also sometimes filled the gaps by deferring to the executive branch’s interpretation,119 an approach that might be consistent with other aspects of our
constitutional structure, as originally understood, or with normative
considerations, such as the executive’s greater expertise or sensitivity
to international relations. We might also favor the interpretation that
accords with the one given the treaty by our treaty partners.120
Among the approaches that might be used to close whatever gap
might be left by international law rules of treaty interpretation, a rule
favoring the continued application of state law would have to vie
David J. Bederman, Revivalist Canons and Treaty Interpretation, 41 UCLA L. REV. 953,
967 (1994).
116 See Steven P. Croley & John H. Jackson, WTO Dispute Procedures, Standard of
Review, and Deference to National Governments, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 193, 200 (1996) (suggesting “it is not clear in light of [the Vienna] Convention whether or how a panel
could ever reach the conclusion that provisions of an agreement admit of more than
one interpretation” because the Convention provides rules for resolving ambiguities
in the text of an international agreement). But cf. Daniel K. Tarullo, The Hidden Costs
of International Dispute Settlement: WTO Review of Domestic Anti-Dumping Decisions, 34 LAW
& POL’Y INT’L BUS. 109, 175–79 (2002) (questioning whether the Vienna Convention
provides rules to resolve all ambiguities in treaty text).
117 See, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243,
259–61 (1984); United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 417–18 (1886); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 284–85 (1796).
118 See Vázquez, Treaty-Based Rights, supra note 95, at 1102–03, 1162.
119 See Medellı́n v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1361 (2008).
120 Cf. Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644, 660 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“[I]t is reasonable to impute to the parties [to a treaty] an intent that their respective
courts strive to interpret the treaty consistently.”).
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against these alternative rules also supported by the constitutional
structure. In any event, because the constitutionally specified procedures for making federal law reflect a balance of nationalism and federalism (or continuity and change), the particular aspect of the
constitutional structure on which Clark relies (the specification of
only three ways to create supreme federal law) does not support a rule
reflexively favoring one over the other.
With respect to federal statutes, the point is less obvious but
equally true. In contrast to the rules of treaty interpretation, the rules
of statutory interpretation are not external to our legal system. It is
therefore more difficult to point to a “correct” approach to statutory
interpretation that bears no relation to the original understanding of
the structure created by the Constitution for the creation of supreme
federal law. But, just as the constitutional structure provides no basis
for a rule that ambiguities in treaties be resolved in favor of the states
or the status quo, it provides no basis for that conclusion with respect
to statutes.
To determine how to interpret statutes, we need a theory of statutory interpretation. What the best or “correct” theory is for interpreting statutes in general, or federal statutes in particular, is highly
contested. This is not the place to engage that debate. My point is
that the original understanding of the constitutional structure does
not support a rule under which ambiguities are always resolved in
favor of state law or the status quo. Such a rule might be defensible,
but its defenders would have to rely on something other than the Constitution’s specification of only three methods of creating federal law.
That state law applies by default, and can be displaced only in the
constitutionally specified ways, means that state law remains applicable when the rules of statutory interpretation have been applied and
have not yielded an interpretation that displaces state law. But the
constitutional structure as such is unhelpful in determining the content of the rules of statutory interpretation.
Consider the presumption against preemption. Clark argues that
the original understanding of the constitutional structure requires the
presumption because the Constitution reflects a desire not to displace
state law in the absence of an affirmative decision to do so by both
houses plus the President.121 On this view, obstacle preemption
would be inconsistent with the constitutional structure, as would
implied preemption of any kind. Field preemption would be proper
only if there were evidence that both houses and the President
intended to preempt the field. In the absence of a direct conflict
121

See Clark, supra note 1, at 1429.
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between state and federal law or clear affirmative evidence of the
lawmakers’ intent to displace state law, state law would continue to
govern.122
But Article I, Section 7 tells us only that state law cannot be displaced by statute unless a majority of both houses votes in favor of the
statute and the President does not veto it. It does not tell us how the
statute is to be interpreted. Because the structure reflects a balance
between continuity and change, it does not support a rule that reflexively favors continuity. Most contemporary scholarship on statutory
interpretation is based on frankly normative arguments.123 An
originalist might prefer an approach based on the Founders’ expectations about how statutes should be interpreted.124 If there were direct
evidence that the Founders intended that federal statutes be interpreted not to displace state (or prior federal) law, then such evidence
might support a presumption against preemption (depending on
one’s approach to originalism). That the founding generation did
not hold such a view is suggested by Chief Justice Marshall’s approach
to preemption in McCulloch v. Maryland,125 which appears to be an
early version of obstacle preemption.126
With respect to statutory interpretation more generally, an
originalist might be persuaded by evidence that the prevailing
approach to interpreting statutes at the time of the Founding was to
interpret them as narrowly as possible. The maxim that statutes in
derogation of the common law are to be construed narrowly may provide some support for such a view. But the maxim would not appear
to apply when a federal statute alters state statutes, as opposed to the
122 See id. at 1435 (“Under the Supremacy Clause . . . the relevant inquiry is
whether Congress intended to displace state law.”). Clark observes that state law
should be displaced only when the federal statute requires a court to do so. See id. at
1433.
123 See, e.g., William S. Blatt, Interpretive Communities: The Missing Element in Statutory
Interpretation, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 629 (2001); Einer Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting Statutory
Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2162 (2002); Ethan J. Leib, Friendship & the Law, 54
UCLA L. REV. 631 (2007); Adrian Vermeule, The Judiciary Is a They, Not an It: Interpretive Theory and the Fallacy of Division, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 549 (2005).
124 Or she might not. Cf. Berman, supra note 22, at 385–89 (asserting that almost
nobody embraces original expected application approach).
125 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 425–37 (1819).
126 See Betsy J. Grey, Make Congress Speak Clearly: Federal Preemption of State Tort Remedies, 77 B.U. L. REV. 559, 567–68 (1997) (noting that McCulloch established “a broad
proscription [that] would allow courts to strike down vast numbers of state laws”); S.
Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civic Republican Values, 71 B.U. L. REV. 685,
715 (1991) (noting that, under McCulloch, “merely ‘interfering’ with federal law justifies nullification of state law” (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 210
(1824); McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 430)).
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common law. A broader rule requiring that statutes be interpreted
narrowly would apply equally to statutes repealing prior federal laws,
thus hindering the devolution of power to the states. In any event,
any such “originalist” approach to preemption or statutory interpretation would be driven by independent evidence of the Founders’ intent
on those topics, not by the constitutional structure as such.
In short, to establish the correct approach to preemption, one
needs a separate theory of statutory interpretation and/or judicial
decisionmaking. A departure from the correct theory of statutory
interpretation in either direction would be illegitimate. If the correct
approach is originalism and obstacle preemption were correct on
originalist grounds, then to articulate and enforce a presumption
against preemption would be to add to the requirements for federal
lawmaking, in violation of the Founders’ attempt to adopt a mechanism balancing federalism and nationalism. Of course, the correct
approach to statutory interpretation is endlessly contestable. But constitutional structure alone does not help resolve the contest.
Consider next Clark’s structural defense of the Court’s current
restrictive approach to the implication of private rights of action
under federal statutes.127 The Supreme Court has in recent years selfconsciously adopted a more demanding approach to this question. At
one time, the courts generally inferred a right of action for damages
from a statute not addressing private remedies on the theory that
rights of action would make the statute more effective.128 Interestingly, the turn to a more restrictive approach was based in part on an
insight very similar to my main point in Part II of this Article with
respect to the Constitution—that legislation is never unidimensional,
but rather is always the product of compromise.129 A statute that
includes substantive provisions but does not create a private right of
action for enforcing the substantive provisions might simply reflect a
legislative compromise. Congress may have wanted to go so far and
no further. Congress, in other words, may not have wanted a more
effective statute.
127 See Clark, supra note 1, at 1423–24.
128 See, e.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964).
129 See Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 740 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting)
(“Determining whether a private action would be consistent with the ‘underlying purposes’ of a legislative scheme permits a court to decide for itself what the goals of a
scheme should be, and how those goals should be advanced.”); RICHARD A. POSNER,
THE FEDERAL COURTS 271–72 (1985) (discussing the effect of “a clash of interest
groups” on the legislative process). My point in Part II is that the constitutional structure was not designed solely to safeguard federalism or the status quo, but reflects a
compromise between federalism and nationalism or between continuity and change.
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Clark argues that the judicial refusal to infer a private right of
action also derives support from the Constitution’s structure—in particular, its enumeration of only three methods of creating supreme
federal law.130 To create a federal right of action where the statute
does not explicitly contain one would be to recognize federal lawmaking through procedures not meeting the constitutional requirements
for making federal law.131 The constitutional default is the continued
application of state law. If Congress enacted a substantive law unaccompanied by an express federal right of action, then one must look
to state law to determine the available rights of action.132
Recognition that the Constitution reflects a balance of federalism
and nationalism poses some of the same problems for this line of analysis as for the presumption against preemption. If the statute does not
contain an express right of action, then a right of action did not successfully run the supreme law gauntlet. But the statute containing the
substantive provision did successfully run the gauntlet, and the question remains whether the substantive law should be interpreted to
confer a federal right of action. If the constitutional structure reflects
a balance of continuity and change, or federalism and nationalism,
then it does not support a reflexive preference for state law. To
answer the question, we need a theory of statutory interpretation, and,
for the reasons indicated, the constitutional structure does not tell us
what the right theory is.
For an originalist, the answer may turn on how the right-of-action
issue would have been resolved at the time of the Founding. At that
130 See Clark, supra note 1, at 1424.
131 See id. at 1423 (arguing that such actions by the Court undercut the Constitution’s separation of powers and federal lawmaking procedures); see also Touche Ross
& Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568 (1979) (evaluating whether a statutory cause of
action exists consistently with the restrictive approach by stating the question is one of
“statutory construction” (citing Cannon, 441 U.S. at 688)); George D. Brown, Of Activism and Erie—The Implication Doctrine’s Implications for the Nature and Role of the Federal
Courts, 69 IOWA L. REV. 617, 644–49 (1984) (defending Justice Powell’s position in
Cannon denying the implication of private rights of action except in cases of compelling congressional intent); Richard W. Creswell, The Separation of Powers Implications of
Implied Rights of Action, 34 MERCER L. REV. 973, 995 (1983) (explaining that the congressional intent approach safeguards federalism because the states are represented
in the Senate). But see Susan J. Stabile, The Role of Congressional Intent in Determining the
Existence of Implied Private Rights of Action, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 861, 903–04 (1996)
(arguing that implication decisions should not be based on congressional intent
alone; rather, the decision to imply a private right of action should weigh several
other factors).
132 See, e.g., Brown, supra note 131, at 645 (noting that in the absence of private
rights of action, “state common-law remedies may well be available, at least if the area
of law is not one of exclusive federal jurisdiction”).
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time, rights of action for statutes not explicitly addressing the question
would have been supplied by the common law.133 Since today we
regard the common law as the law of the states, one might conclude
that the originalist approach to rights of action is in accord with the
recent restrictive approach to the issue. If so, the originalist answer
would track Clark’s structural answer, but the answer would be driven
by direct evidence of the Founders’ intent, not by the constitutional
structure as such.
But the originalist answer is not so clear. At the time of the
Founding, the common law was thought to have a separate existence,
and state and federal courts were regarded as equally capable of ascertaining it.134 In cases involving federal statutes, it would most often
have fallen to a federal court (the Supreme Court on review from the
state courts) ultimately to decide the content of that common law.
Today, we do not believe that the common law has a separate existence.135 This shift in our understanding of the common law would
appear to require a translation of prior practices to accord with modern understandings, the sort of translation the majority undertook in
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain136 with respect to the Alien Tort Statute.137
The result of such a translation might well be an approach that
approximates the prior, more receptive approach, more than the current restrictive approach. In any event, whether or not one takes an
originalist approach, the structural considerations Clark points to do
not help resolve the question.
133 See Ann Woolhandler, Public Rights, Private Rights, and Statutory Retroactivity, 94
GEO. L.J. 1015, 1020, 1062 (2006) (noting that “[t]he Constitution . . . was written
against a backdrop of . . . traditional common law interests”).
134 See Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842) (“In the ordinary use of language it will hardly be contended that the decisions of Courts constitute laws. They
are, at most, only evidence of what the laws are; and are not of themselves laws.”),
overruled by Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); see also Stephen M. Feldman, From Premodern to Modern American Jurisprudence: The Onset of Positivism, 50 VAND.
L. REV. 1387, 1393 (1997) (characterizing “premodern” jurisprudence as “retain[ing]
a faith in natural law principles as the foundation of the common law system and the
ultimate source of legal knowledge”).
135 See Erie, 304 U.S. at 78–79 (rejecting the premise that there is a “ ‘transcendental body’ ” of common law that federal courts may ascertain independently of the
states because “ ‘law in the sense in which courts speak of it today does not exist without some definite authority behind it. The common law . . . is not the common law
generally but the law of that State existing by the authority of that State’ ” (quoting
Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276
U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting))).
136 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
137 See id. at 729.
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While the presumption against preemption and the restrictive
approach to inferring rights of action from federal statutes might be
criticized as illegitimately adding to the obstacles to federal lawmaking
or illegitimately subtracting from the force of supreme federal law, the
stakes might be regarded as small. The Court is, after all, simply articulating background rules of interpretation to aid in the ascertainment
of legislative intent. Certainly the stakes are reduced by the fact that
Congress can legislate around them. (The same could, of course, be
said about the contrary interpretive rules, so this is not a defense the
rules selected. It is merely a comment about their (relative) unimportance.) Since Congress creates the substantive right, it seems proper
to leave the question of preemptive effect and remedies ultimately to
Congress’ judgment. The presumptions articulated by the Court,
even if lacking a proper constitutional foundation, can be legislated
around, and, once articulated, have some legitimate claim to continued application because of the doctrine of stare decisis.
Of greater concern is the Court’s current approach to constitutional remedies. The Court appears to view the availability of remedies for constitutional violations to be analogous to the question of
remedies for violation of statutes that do not directly address private
remedies.138 Some recent cases assume that the primary responsibility
for articulating the availability of remedies for constitutional violations
resides in Congress and suggest that judicial recognition of such rights
of action is problematic.139 But the originalist case sketched above for
a more receptive approach to inferring remedies for statutory violations applies equally to the question of remedies for constitutional violations.140 In addition, the Supremacy Clause provides a textual basis
for a federal constitutional law of constitutional remedies.141 The
Founders distinguished law from admonition on the ground that the
138 See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 19 (1980) (recognizing a damages remedy
for violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 244 (1979) (recognizing implied rights of
action for damages under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause); Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 395 (1971) (holding that the Fourth Amendment provides a cause of action for damages against federal officers).
139 In Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983), and Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412,
(1988), the Court held a new judicial remedy should not be created in light of the
existing elaborate remedial schemes constructed by Congress. See id. at 428–29;
Lucas, 462 U.S. at 389–90.
140 See supra notes 133–37 and accompanying text.
141 See Carlos M. Vázquez, The Constitution as Law of the Land: The Supremacy
Clause and Judicial Review 30–57 (Apr. 18, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author).
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former is attended with a judicial sanction for its violation.142 The
Constitution’s designation of the Constitution as law could thus be
understood as an instruction to the courts to enforce a constitutional
law of sanctions for constitutional violations, a law grounded in the
common law but adjusted by the courts to ensure the efficacy of constitution limitations. One well-established sanction for constitutional
violations is the nullity of nonconforming legislative acts.143 Thus, the
Supremacy Clause provides a textual basis for judicial review of legislation.144 But, in my view, the Supremacy Clause also contemplates the
articulation and enforcement of a federal law of affirmative sanctions
for constitutional violations. If so, then it is improper for the Court to
assume that sanctions exist only to the extent that Congress creates
them. Erroneously leaving constitutional remedies to Congress is of
greater concern than erroneously requiring express congressional creation of remedies for statutory violations because most constitutional
norms are limits on Congress itself or similarly majoritarian
institutions.
Cases recognizing federal remedies for constitutional violations
are sometimes described as exercises in federal common lawmaking.145 The problematizing of federal common lawmaking is perhaps
the clearest implication of Clark’s structural argument. If defined as
the judicial articulation of federal law not reasonably traceable to the
three forms of law specified in the Supremacy Clause,146 federal common lawmaking necessarily violates Clark’s claim that those three
142 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 15, at 72–73 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W.
Carey & James McClellan eds., 2001).
143 See Vázquez, supra note 141.
144 In this respect, my argument parallels the textual defense of judicial review in
Bradford R. Clark, The Supremacy Clause as a Constraint on Federal Power, 71 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 91 (2003). However, whereas Clark relies on the Supremacy Clause’s denial of
legal status to statutes not passed “in Pursuance” of the Constitution, see id. at 99–105,
I rely on the Clause’s designation of the Constitution as “Law.”
145 See Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 75 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(“Bivens is a relic of the heady days in which this Court assumed common-law powers
to create causes of action—decreeing them to be ‘implied’ by the mere existence of a
statutory or constitutional prohibition.”); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 39 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“The determination by federal courts of the scope of such
a remedy [for constitutional violations] involves the creation of a body of common
law analogous to that repudiated in Erie . . . .”). But see Ryan D. Newman, Note, From
Bivens to Malesko and Beyond: Implied Constitutional Remedies and the Separation of Powers, 85 TEX. L. REV. 471, 476 (2006) (arguing that cases recognizing implied constitutional remedies do not violate the separation of powers).
146 See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 16, at 685 (defining federal common law as
“federal rules of decision whose content cannot be traced by traditional methods of
interpretation to federal statutory or constitutional commands”).
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forms of federal lawmaking are exclusive.147 As Clark recognizes,
much that is described as (illegitimate) federal common law can be
defended as (legitimate) constitutional or statutory interpretation.148
The argument just sketched concerning constitutional remedies is a
claim that the existence of such remedies should be regarded as a
matter of (legitimate) constitutional interpretation. Still, the Court
does sometimes engage in federal common lawmaking that cannot be
justified as statutory or constitutional interpretation.149 If Clark’s
exclusivity thesis has a doctrinal payoff, it would seem to be to delegitimate federal common lawmaking of this sort. When the courts
engage in such lawmaking, they are displacing state law in circumstances where the procedural requirements of federal lawmaking have
not been met. To permit such lawmaking is to allow the courts to
circumvent the Constitution’s carefully wrought procedures for displacing state law.150 Or so it would seem.
Yet even here, the answer is not so clear. Clark’s argument may
suggest that courts should not engage in any additional displacement
of state law through federal common lawmaking. Where the courts
have already displaced state law in this fashion, however, another wellrecognized principle calls into question the propriety of changing
course. I refer here to the doctrine of stare decisis, which even
originalist judges concede may trump original intent.151 Indeed, the
doctrine of stare decisis, by its nature, must trump otherwise correct
legal interpretations, which, for an originalist, would include the
answer provided by the constitutional structure as originally understood. Since there is evidence that the Founders contemplated stare
decisis,152 there is some originalist pedigree for this departure from
otherwise correct originalist results. The Court applies a particularly
strong form of stare decisis to questions of statutory interpretation on
147 See Clark, supra note 1, at 1330–31.
148 See id. at 1453–55.
149 See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504–07 (1988); Clearfield Trust
Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366 (1943).
150 This critique of federal common lawmaking is also developed in Thomas W.
Merrill, The Judicial Prerogative, 12 PACE L. REV. 327, 349–52 (1992).
151 See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 861–62
(1989).
152 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 142, at 407 (“To
avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that they should be
bound down by strict rules and precedents, which serve to define and point out their
duty in every particular case that comes before them . . . .”); see also Jonathan T.
Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 8 (2006) (“[T]he Founders expected judges to be constrained . . . by prior cases . . . .”).
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the theory that Congress can correct any judicial error.153 For the
same reason, the stronger form of stare decisis would seem to be
applicable as well to questions of federal common law.154 If so, then
the Court should adhere to prior judicial decisions recognizing federal common law in a given area, even if Clark is right in concluding
that those decisions were in conflict with the constitutional structure
when rendered.155
Moreover, once doctrinal change has been accomplished
through judicial decisionmaking, combined with the doctrine of stare
decisis, it may be highly problematic for courts to continue to decide
cases on other issues according to the original understanding. A concern for doctrinal coherence could legitimately lead a court to depart
from the “correct” approach (from an originalist perspective) on
issues collateral to those decided erroneously (from an originalist perspective) in earlier cases. A different approach would result in a legal
landscape full of ad hoc exceptions. Fairness and rule of law values,
not unlike those that underlie stare decisis, demand that like cases be
treated alike and that exceptions to general principles be justified. It
would not be surprising if the Founders believed in these values as
well and would have concurred in subordinating otherwise “correct”
results, from an originalist standpoint, to such concerns. If so, then
there would be an originalist pedigree for this further departure from
correct originalist results.
Indeed, the combination of doctrinal change through stare decisis and the need for doctrinal coherence may properly lead to a
153 See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172–73 (1989) (“[T]he
burden borne by the party advocating the abandonment of an established precedent
is greater where the Court is asked to overrule a point of statutory construction. Considerations of stare decisis have special force in the area of statutory interpretation, for
here, unlike in the context of constitutional interpretation, the legislative power is
implicated, and Congress remains free to alter what we have done.”); Ill. Brick Co. v.
Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736 (1977) (“[C]onsiderations of stare decisis weigh heavily in
the area of statutory construction, where Congress is free to change this Court’s interpretation of its legislation.”). See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory
Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361 (1988) (examining the Court’s “super-strong presumption against overruling statutory precedents”).
154 Like statutory decisions, decisions regarding federal common law are subject
to congressional revision.
155 For the same reason, it would be inappropriate for the Court to overrule its
dormant Commerce Clause and dormant foreign affairs cases, even if one agreed with
critics of these doctrines that these cases were erroneous when rendered. See Carlos
Manuel Vázquez, W(h)ither Zschernig?, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1259, 1308 (2001). It is well
recognized that dormant Commerce Clause decisions are subject to congressional
revision, see Itel Containers Int’l Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60, 75–76 (1993), and
the same is presumably true of dormant foreign affairs decisions.
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broader rejection of Clark’s central claim. Among the doctrinal
changes that have occurred since the Founding is an enormously
important one that is itself in conflict with Article I, Section 7. I refer
to the acceptance of broad, largely unguided delegations of lawmaking power to the executive branch. Although the Court at one time
insisted that Congress could not delegate its lawmaking power,156 the
Court today acknowledges that any constitutional limits on such delegations are not judicially enforceable.157 Thus, the Court today acquiesces in supreme federal lawmaking by a single agency. In light of this
departure from the constitutional structure, as originally understood,
insisting on adherence to bicameralism and presentment may have
the result of distorting the constitutional structure, as it was originally
intended to operate. In other words, given the acceptance of this one
significant departure from the original structure, faithfulness to the
original design may require additional departures from the original
structure. Without compensating changes in other areas, the acceptance of broad delegations to the executive may leave us further from
the Founders’ goals in adopting the structure they adopted. For
example, as Abner Greene, William Eskridge, and John Ferejohn have
persuasively argued, faithfulness to the original structure may require
that acceptance of broad delegations to the executive be matched by
acceptance of some forms of legislative vetoes.158
Given this and other changes in our legal doctrine since the
Founding, there may be very little remaining room for strict adherence to any particular feature of the constitutional structure as originally understood. This is not to say that the original structure is
irrelevant to judicial decisionmaking today. But, if faithfulness to the
original structure is the goal, we must look at that structure at a high
level of generality, and we will need to adjust the original features of
that structure in a way that best accomplishes the Founders’ broad
goals in the light of entrenched changes in the legal landscape since
the Founding.159 Given the acceptance of broad delegations of legislative power to the executive, it may be that the best way to be faithful
156 See, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529–42
(1935).
157 See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472–76 (2001).
158 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80
GEO. L.J. 523, 540–43 (1992); Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 123, 179–95 (1994).
159 See Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 SUP.
CT. REV. 125, 213; Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN. L. REV. 395, 439–42 (1995).
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to the structure of the Constitution, as originally understood, is to
depart from bicameralism and presentment in some contexts.
CONCLUSION
Bradford Clark has made an important contribution to the literature on both separation of power and federalism by explaining how
the Constitution’s provisions for making federal law often operate to
safeguard the interests of the states and reminding us that departures
from the constitutionally prescribed ways of creating federal law are
problematic and require justification. He deserves great credit for
focusing our attention on these enormously important issues. This
Article attempts to complete Clark’s story by pointing out that the
constitutionally specified procedures for creating federal law reflect a
balance of federalism and nationalism, or continuity and change. It
follows that judicial decisions that add obstacles to supreme federal
lawmaking are as problematic as those that subtract from the constitutionally specified procedures. It also follows that the Constitution’s
specification of only three methods of creating federal law does not
support rules for construing the output of the federal legislative process in a way that would reflexively favor federalism (or the status quo)
over nationalism (or change). Indeed, given the wide acceptance of
significant departures from the original scheme—and the legitimacy
(even from an originalist perspective) of adhering to such departures—faithfulness to the original structure may sometimes require
departing from particular features of the original scheme, including
the requirements of bicameralism and presentment on which Clark
bases much of his analysis.
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